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In Mexico, reducing corporate taxes stimulates investment more
than increasing the investment tax credit or the employment tax
credit does.
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Mexico has experimented with several tax  investment tax credits in Mexico. Mexico had
instruments designed to promote private capital  high inflation and high nominal interest rates,
formation. Among such initiatives were general  with real interest rates negative for certain years
and industry-specific tax credits, employment tax  - so firms faced severe financing constraints. In
credits, and corporate tax reductions.  such a macroeconomic climate, firms see re-
duced tax rates as improving their cash flow and
Feltenstein and Shah examine the relative  a signal of an improved public policy climate.
efficacy of such instruments using a dynamic
computable general equilibrium model. They  In a period of economic uncertainty and
carry out model simulations using three equal-  decline, nonrefundable, unindexed tax credits on
yield investment incentive scenarios: increases in  new investments are less valuable than an
investment tax credits, increases in employment  immediate reduction in tax liability from both
tax credits, and an equivalent reduction in the  old and new capital.
corporate tax rate.
Finally, in an open economy, reducing the
Of the three, they find that reducing corpo-  tax rate increases the demand for all capital
rate taxes is most effective at stimulating invest-  rather than new capital alone - so the relative
ment in Mexico.  value of domestic capital rises. Accordingly, the
public increases its holdings of domestic debt,
Various explanations are plausible for why  causing the price of domestic bonds to rise and
reducing tax rates is superior to providing  real interest rates to fall, stimulating investment.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the  findings  of workunder  way  in  theBank.  An  objectiveof  the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished. The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank policy.
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1.  Introduction
Public  policy  officials  in Mexico  have,  over the past several  decades,
experimented  with  a  number  of  tax  instruments  designed  to  promote  private  capital
formation.  Among such  initiatives  were  general  and  industry  specific  tax  credits,
employment  tax  credits,  and  corporate  rate  reductions.  This  paper  examines  the
relative  efficacy  of such tax instruments  using a dynamic  computable  general
equilibrium  framework.
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  an  outline  of  the  tax
policy  environment  for  the  corporate  sector  in  Mexico.  Section  3 presents  model
details. Section 4  highlights  alternate tax  incentives  regimes and model
simulation  results.  Finally,  a concluding  section  provides  a summary  of the
results.
2.  Tax Incentives  for Investment  in  Mexiso
Tax incentive  regimes  in Mexico  have undergone  significant  changes  over
time.  These  are  briefly  discussed  below:
1955-1972:  Between  20% (for secondary  industries)  and 40% (for  basic
industries)  corporate  income  of  Mexican  majority  owned  enterprises  was  exempted
from  corporate  taxation  for  periods  varying  between  five  to  ten  years.  The  same
industries  also  could  receive,  upon  application,  exemption  from  certain  indirect
taxes  and import  duties  on capital  goods  imports.
1972-1979:  Industries  that were seen to promote decentralization  and
regional  development  were  granted  import  duty  relief  varying  from  50%  to 100%  and
reduction  in  corporate  tax  liability  ranging  from  10%  to  40%  depending  upon  their
location  and  type  of activity.
1979-1986s  The practice  of import  duty exemption  was continued.  In
addition,  tax incentives  certificates  (CEPROFIS)  providing  tax credit  in the
*  This is  one  of a series  of discussion  papers  prepared  for  the  World  Bank
research project,  "An  Evaluation of  Tax  Incentives For  Industrial and
Technological  Development".  The  project  is  directed  by  Anwar  Shah  of  the  Public
Economics  Division,  Country  Economics  Department.  The authors  are grateful  to
Daniel  Oks for  helpful  comments.-2-
range  of 10-25%,  depending  upon  location,  and  type  and  size  of the  industry,  for
investment in physical assets were  introduced.  These certificates  were
negotiable  and  could  be used against  any  federal  tax  liability  by the  holder.
1986-Present:  The tax incentive  certificate  scheme  was significantly
tightened  and  targeted  to  priority  industries  and  preferred  zones (See  Appendix
Table Al).  The top tax credit  rate for CEPROFI  was raised  to 40% of total
physical  investment  in  1986. In  addition  Mexican-owned  enterprises  are  eligible
for  employment  tax  credits  up  to 30%  of  three  times  the  annual  area  minimum  wage
multiplied  by  the  number  of  new  jobs  created. In  addition,  full  expensing  of  the
present  value  of  capital  consumption  allowance&  calculated  using  a  7.5%  discount
rate  was  allowed  in  non-metropolitan  areas. In  the  metropolitan  industrialized
areas  of Mexico  City,  D.F.,  Monterrey  and  Guadalajara,  only 60%  of the  present
value of depreciation  allowances  could be deducted  in the first year.  R&D
investment  tax  credit  at  15%  for  the  purchase  of  technological  research  (20%  for
small  and micro enterprises),  and 20% for capital  purchases  by technological
enterprises  (30%  for small  and micro enterprises)  are currently  permissible.
Further  details  regarding  the  corporate  income  taxation  and  foregone  revenues  due
to tax  incentives  in Mexico  is  given in  Appendix  A.
3.  Model  Specification
In  this  section  we will  develop  the  model  we will  use  to  analyze  a  variety
of fiscal  issues  in Mexico. In particular,  the  model  will  be designed  to look
at the implications  for revenues, sectoral investment,  and the balance of
payments  of  a  number  of  different  tax  programs. We will  consider  investment  tax
credits, and employment  tax credits. The model can be easily extended to
incorporate  accelerated  depreciation  allowances,  tax  holidays,  and  immediate  full
expensing.  Our model will also permit experimentation  with changes in the
structure  of indirect  taxation  as  well  as  the  personal  income  tax. The  model  we
develop  is intended  to be a microeconomic  optimizing  structure  that generates
macroeconomic  outputs. Since  our  aim is empirical  implementation,  much  of the
structure  we incorporate  is chosen  because  of the availability  of data.- 3 -
We use a  two period  general  equilibrium  system  in which  all agent.  have
perfect foresight,  and hence in period 1 correctly  anticipate  the price.  of
period  2.  We need to specify  the behavior  of production,  consumption,  and
government  output,  taxation,  and deficit  financing. We need also specify  the
exchange  rate  regime  and  the  characteristics  of  the  trade  system. A oolution  is
found  for  both  periods  simultaneously,  so that  we will  be determining  outcomes
for  both  years,  and  hence  corresponding  rates  of change.
a.  Production
There  are  8 factors  of production  and  3  types  of financial  sA-et  The.e
are:
1-5.  Capital  types  9.  Foreign  bonds
6.  Urban  labor  10.  Rural  labor
7.  Money  11.  Land
8.  Domestic  bonds
The  five  types  of  capital  correspond  to  the  five  productive  sectors,  which  do  not
include  agriculture,  that  we will describe  shortly. Each  of these factors  and
financial  assets  is replicated  in each period,  so that we have, for example,
period  1 capital  and  period  2 capital.  Period  1  money  will be the numeraire.
Thus the  model  has 22 dimensions,  or prices.
An  input-output  matrix is used to determine intermediate  and  final
production. This  matrix  is replicated  in  each  of two years. Corresponding  to
each  sector  in  the  input-output  matrix,  value  added  is  produced  using  capital  and
urban labor for the non-agricultural  sectors,  and land and rural labor in
agriculture.  The  technology  that  produces  this  value  added  is  sector-specific. 1
Our  data  source  for  the  input-output  matrix  is  Matriz  de  Insumo-Prod'4cto  Anno
198  (1988).  Here  a  72  sector  matrix  is  derived  which  represents  Mexico's
technology  for  1980. We have  not attempted  to update  the  matrix  for  the  years
which  we  will  be analyzing. Since  it is  not  our  intention  to  work  at this  leve.
of sectoral  disaggregation,  we have  aggregated  the technology  to seven  sectors
1The  use  of neo-classical  value  added  functions  "sitting  above"  an input-
output  matrix  is common. The  reader  may  wish  to see  Shoven  and  Whalley (1984)
for  articles  that  use  this  approach. An application  and  detailed  description  of
functional  forms  is given  in Feltenstein  (1986).- 4 -
by  adding  corresponding  rcvs  and columns.  The  resulting  sectors  and  the
corresponding  sectoro  in  the  initial  matrix  are:
Table  1.  agaregate  Input-Output  Sectors
Aggregate  Sector  Correspondino  Disaaareaated  Sectors
1.  Agriculture  1-4
2.  Manufacturing  5,7-61
3.  Petroleum  6
4.  Commerce  62-63
5.  Transportation  64
6.  Communications  and services  65-72
7.  Imports
We denote  the resulting  input-output  matrix  by A. 2
The specific  formulation  of the firm's  problem  is as follows. Lot yjKi,
yIi  be  the inputs  of capital  and  urban  labor  to the  jth  non-agricultural  sector
in period  i.  Let  YGi  be the outstanding  stock  of government  infrastructure  in
period  i.  The  production  of value  added  is then  given  by
va  - vajj(Yii#YLi  (1)
Recall  that  capital  is  sector  specific  and  there  are  two  types  of  labor.  In  the
case of agriculture,  equation (1)  takes the same form, except  that land is
substituted  for  capital  and  rural  labor  is  substituted  for  urban  labor.  We are
supposing  that  there  is  a  single  type  of  infrastructure,  although  extensions  to
sector  specific  infrastructure  would  present  no  problem. Infrastructure  may  be
thought  of, for  example,  as  roads,  communications,  education,  and  so  forth,  and
enters  private  production  as an increase  in productivity.
It  is  assumed  that  sector  j  cost-minimizes  with  respect  to  capital  and
urban  labor,  in  the  case  of a  non-agricultural  sector,  and  with  respect  to land
and  rural  labor  in  the  case  of agriculture. Sector  j  pays  value  added  taxes  on
inputs  of capital  and  labor,  given  by tiJi,  tjki,  respectively,  in  period  i.  We
2A  program  that permits  the user  to arbitrarily  aggregate  particular  rows
and  columns  is available  upon  request  from  the author.- 5  -
assume  that  there  are  no  taxes  paid  upon  the  use  of  land  by  agriculture,  although
agriculture  is  taxed  on  its  use  of  labor. 3 We will  also  suppose  that  the  sector
may  be  given  an  employment  tax  credit.  This  credit  is given  by  a  percentage
rebate  on  the  value  of  the  firm's  wage  bill.  Hence  the  effective  price  for
labor  paid  by  sector  j  is:
pLii - (I  +  tLij  - aij)  PLi
where  aU is  the  employment  tax  credit  given  to  sector  j.
Similarly,  the  effective  price  of  capital  for  sector  j  is:
PKij  - (1  +  tKij)  PKij
Thus  if  PK4j and  PLii  are  the  prices  of  capital  and  labor  in  period  i,  then  the
prices  charged  by  enterprises,  Pi,  are  given  by
(Pi}  - va(P,YGi)(l  +  t)(I  - A)  ,  (2)
where  va(P,YGi)  is  the  vector  of  cost-minimizing  value-added  per
unit  of  output,  subject  to  P  - {PKjj,  PUj)  and  Y 0 i,  and
t - {tKi,  tLi)-
Here  we  treat  imports  as  a  single  product  that  is  distinct  from  domestic
production.4  Thus  there  is  no  value  added  by  factors  in  imports.  Rather,
imports  require  foreign  exchange,  which  is,  in  turn,  produced  by  exports.
We suppose  that  each  type  of  sectoral  capital  is  produced  via  a  sector-
specific  investment  technology  that  uses  inputs  of  capital  and  labor  to
produce  new  capital.  Investment  is  carried  out  by  the  private  sector,  and
since  the capital  that  is produced  in  one  period  becomes  available  only  in  the
next  period,  the  investor  must  pay  for  the  input  cost  of  its  production  in  the
current  period,  but  will  receive  the  revenue  from  that  capital  in  the  next
3The  interpretation  of  these  taxe  is  thus  as  a  profit  tax  and  a  personal
income  tax  that  is  withheld  at  the  source.
4This  assumption,  due  to  Armington  (1969),  permits  us  to  avoid  problems  of
corner  solutions,  tha.  is,  solutions  in  which  a  good  is either  entirely
domestically  produced  or  entirely  imported.period. We will assume  that investment  i. entirely  financed  by domestic
borrowing,  so that  the investor  sells  domestic  bonds  to pay his factors  of
produec-  ton.S Accordingly,  the investor  equates  the  coot  of borrowing,  given
by the interest  rate,  with  the anticipated  future  returns  on capital.
The investor  is affected  by several  fLocal  parameters  in maklng  his
decision. He receives  an investment  tax credit  an well as a  depreciation
allowance. He also  pays a capital,  or profit  tax,  on the  returns  to hi.
investment. Let us define  the followlng  notation.
kim  Investment  tax  credit  in  period  1 (percent).
dL-  Depreciation  allowance  in  period  L  (percent).6
tki  Profit  (capital)  tax rate (percent)
CHi-  The cost of producing  the quantity  Hi of capital  in period  i
ri-  The interest  rate  in period  i.
PrK,  The return  to capital  in period  i.
Pmi-  The  price  of  money in  period  i.
Suppose,  then,  that  the  rental  price  of capital  in  period  L+1  is Py+1.
If CHi  is the  cost-minimizing  cost  of producing  the  quantity  of capital,  Hi,
then future  debt  obligations  must be equal  to the return  on new capital.
Hence:
(1  - tk)pS  H1
CHi(l  - ki- dL)  +  r  (3)
where  ri  is the interest  rate in  period  i, glven  bys
SWe  assume  that  all foreign  borrowing  for  lnvestment  is  carrled  out  by the
government,  so that, implicitly,  the government  is borrowlng  for the private
investor  but the debt thereby incurred  is publicly  guaranteed.  In terms of
Mexico, this may be viewed as the situation existing after the financial
collapse.
6Thie  may  be  Lnterpreted  as  an  accelerated  depreclation  allowance,  since  the
firm is permitted  to take the allowance  in the current  period, although  the
capital  does not  come on line  until  the  next  period.- 7 -
ri  - I/PBi  (4)
where  PBi  is  the price  of a  bond in period  i. 7
Thuo  all mectors  in  the  economy  pay  both income  and  profit  taxes  to the
government,  while  certain  sectors,  in  particular  agriculture,  may  receive
subsidies. Theme  taxes  are  collected  by the central  government  which  uses
them to finance  its  own expenditure  activities.
The  government  produces  public  goods  using  capital  and labor  am inputs
to production. Theme  good.  are  divided  between  thome  used for  development,
repremented  by capital  expenditure.,  and  thome  which are  represented  by
current  expenditure,  and  which  have  no direct  impact  on privato  output. 8 The
government'.  target  for  the output  of public  goods  im determined  exogenously
in  each time  period  as a fraction  of GDP.  An attempt  to  model an optimizing
government  is  thus not  made.
b.  Conoumption
There  are  two  types  of conmumers,  representing  rural  and  urban  labor.
We suppose  that both  consumer  classes  have  the same  demand  pattern.  for  goods,
and  that  their  demands  for  the seven  different  types  of  good.  are  given  by
constant  fractions  of their  incomes. 9 Thuu  urban  and  rural  consumers  differ
only in terms  of their  initial  wealth.
The consumers  maximize  intertemporal  utility  functions,  which  have am
arguments  the levels  of consumption  and leisure  in each  of the two  periods.
We permit  rural-urban  migration  in that  rural  workers  can  choose  to become
urban  labor  if  the relative  wage is favorable. The consumers  maximize  theme
utllity  functions  subject  to intertemporal  budget  constraints. The consumer
7This  formulation  of  the  investment  tax  credit  is  adapted  form  Auerbach  and
Hines (1988).
8Current  spending  may,  via  its  impact  on  wages,  the  availability  of  capital,
and the interest  rate indirectly  have very considerable  impact  upon private
output.  Feltenstein  and  Morris (1990)  and Shah (1992)  examine  the impact  on
private  output  of spending  on public  infrastructure.
9The  assumption  of  equal  relative  spending  on  different  goods  by  both  urban
and rural consumers  is probably  inaccurate. There is, however,  insufficient
data,  for  us to estimate  individual  demand  functions.-8-
saves by holding money, domestic, bonds, and possibly foreign currency.  He
requires money for transactions purposes, but his demand for money is
sensitive to changes in the interest rate.  The consumer receives income from
his labor, from the rental on any capital or land that he owns, and from the
interest payments on bonds that he has purchased.  He may also receive direct
transfer  payments  from  the  government.  He pays sales taxes on the goods he
consumes, as well as tariffs on imported goods.  The consumer's bond holdin7a
are also subject to a  capital loss if  the domestic interest rate falls.  His
maximization problem is thust
max U(x)  x - (xl,xLl,x2,xL2)  (5)
such thats
(l+ti)  Pixi+PLuixLui+PLrixLri+PMixMi+P;lixBi+SiPBFixBFi  (5a)
- PKi (1-6)  'K+PAiAO+PLuiuai + PLriLri+PMiXM(i_l)+r(i_l)XB(i-l)
+PBixB(i-l)  +eiPBFiXBF(i-lj)+TRi
log  PMixMi  - a  +  b  log  (l+ti)P ixi  - c  log  ri  (5b)
log  PBixBi  - log  eiPBFixBFi  - a +  B  (log  ri  - log  eirFi)  (SC)
log  (Lui/Lr)  - a, +  a 2 log  {PLui  - PLri}/'PLui  +  PLril
(Sd)
if  PLui  2 PLri;  otherwise  log  (Lui/Lri)  =  0
(if  the  representative  household  i8  rural,  otherwise  labor  holdings  are  constant)
PB2xB2  =  (1+t 2 )P 2 x 2 (Se)
where:
Pi - price  vector  of  consumption  goods  in  period  i.
Xi  - vector  of  consumption  in  period  i.
ti  - vector  of  aales  tax  rates  in  period  i.
PLJd  - price of urban labor in period i.
Lui  - holding  of  urban  labor  in  perlod  i.
PLZi  prlce  of  rural  labor  ln period  i.-9-
-,i  - holding  of  rural  labor  in period  i.
&2  - elasticity  of rural/urban  migration.
Pyj  - price of capital in period i.
K - initial  holding  of capital.
6 - rate  of depreciation  of capital.
xLi  - consumption  of leisure  in  period  i.
PMi  - price  of money  in  period  i.  Money  in  period  1  is  the  numeraire  and  hence
has  a price  of 1.  A decline  in the  relative  price  of money  from  one  period  to
the next  represents  Inflation.
=Mi - holdings  of money  in period  i.
PBi  - discount  price  of a domestic  bond in  period  i.
ri  - domestic  interest  rate in  period  i.
xBi  - quantity  of domestic  bonds  purchased  in period  L.
°i  - the  exchange  rate  in  terms  of  units  of  domestic  currency  per  unit  of  foreign
currency  in  period  i.
PBFi  =  foreign  currency  discount  price  of foreign  bonds  in  period  i.
xBFi  - quantity  of foreign  bonds  purchased  in  period  i.
TRi  - transfer  payments  from  the government  in  period  i.
a, b, c, a, B - estimated  constants.
Thus the  left  hand side  of equation  (5a)  represents  the  value  of
consumption  of goods  and leisure,  as  well as of financial  assets. In
particular,  it incorporates  the sales  and  value  added  tax rates  that the
consumer  may face.  The right  hand side  contains  the  value  of the  consumer's
holdings  of capital  and labor,  as  well as the  principal  values  and  interest
that he receives  from  the  domestic  and  foreign  financial  assets  that he held
at the  end of the  previous  period. Thus  his  budget  constraint  is affected  by
both interest  and  exchange  rates. Equation  (5b)  is a standard  money  demand
equation  in  which  the  demand  for  cash  balances  depends  upon  the  domestic
interest  rate  and  the value  of intended  consumption. Equation  (5c)  says  that
the proportion  of savings  made up of domestic  and  foreign  interest  hearing- 10  -
assets  depends  upon  relative  domeutic  and foreign  interest  rates,  deflated  by
the  exchange  rate.  If  no holdlng  of foreign  assets  is  permitted,  then  savings
is entirely  made up of domestic  bonds.  Finally,  equation  (5d)  is a  migration
equation  that says  that the  change  in the  consumer's  relative  hc.dings  of
urban  and  rural  labor  depends  on the  relative  wage rates. The particular  form
chosen  for  the  dependent  variable  is so  that  the term in  parenthesis  t }  has a
maximum  value  of 1  and a  minimum  value  of 0.  Thus a2 is the  elasticlty  of
substitution  between  urban  and  rural  labor. Some interpretation  is necessary
here.  The specification  says  that the  representatlve  rural  household  starts
off in  period  1 holding  only  rural  labor. If the  urban  wage is higher  than
the  rural  wage,  then  a  portion  of  the  rural  labor  becomes  urban  labor,
depending  upon  the  alasticity  a2 and  the  wage  dlfferential.  Labor  does  not
move  in  the  other  direction,  however,  so  that  if  the  period  2  rural  wage  is
higher  than  the  urban  wage  there  is  no  immigration  back  to  the  country.  The
repreoentative  urban  consumer  never  moves  any  of  his  labor  to  the  country.
Thus  the  utility  function  of  the  rural  consumer  stays  constant  when  he  moves
to  the  city.
The  consumer  saves  by  purchasing  domestic  and  foreign  bonds,  in addition
to holding  money.  He receives  the interest  payments  on these  bonds,  as well
as possible  capital  gains. As indicated  in equation  (Sc) we allow  for  the
possibility  of consumer's  holding  foreign  assets  by formulating  a portfolio
balance  model in  which  consumers  divide  their  savings  between  domestic  and
foreign  assets  on the  basis  of relative  interest  rates  deflated  by the
expected  rate of change  of the  domestlc  currency  relative  to the foreign
currency. There  is an elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic  and foreign
assets,  so that  we do not  necessarily  obtain  factor  price  equalization.
The consumer  pays  market  prices  plus sales  taxes  for  all  goods  except
agriculture,  which  may, for  some  consumers,  be subsidized. Personal  income
taxes  are not  paid  directly  by the  consumer  but are  withheld  at the enterprise
level,  where  profit  taxes  are also  collected. The  total  value  of the
consumer's  consumption  in  each  period  must be equal  to his  corresponding- 11  -
income,  so that  we do not  permit  personal  borrowing. In  the final  period  of
the  model  we impose  an exogenous  savings  rate  on the consumers,  as in equation
(5e)  10  Thus savings  rates  are  endogenously  determined  by intertemporal
maximization  in  period  1 and  are  exogenously  determined  in  the last  period.
In order  to generate  the  necessary  parameters  in  the  Mexican  consumer's
maximization  problem  we have derived  consumption  weights  from  the aggregation
of the  origlnal  input-output  matrix.11  We did not  directly  eotimate  an
elasticity  of demand  for  leisure,  but  experimented  with various  values. The
foreign  consumer  is  represented  by  an  export  equation  which  determines  the
total  U.S.  dollar  amount  that  he  will  spend  on  Mexican  exports.  This  total  is
then  divided  into  consumption  on Mexican  output  of agriculture,  manufacturing
and  petroleum  with shares  of 0.075,  0.531,  and  0.394,  respectively. 12 The
aggregate  export  equation  was  estimated  by OLS  using  annual  data for  non-oil
exports  over  the  period  1950-1985  with  the following  results.
log  E  -0.88 - 0.12  log  RP  +  0.12 log  RP_l  - 0.22  log  RP_2
(0.69)  (-0.04)  (0.31)  (-0.64)
+  1.75 log U - 0.77 log U_  - 0.88 log U 2 +  (6)
(2.13)  (-0.65)  (-1.18)
+  0.95 log EZ 1
(14.05)
R2  *  0.99  H-statistic  =  1.48
Here  we make  the following  definltions.
(a)  E  3  Mexican  non-oil  exports  in  US$s.
(b)  RP  - Relative  US$  price  index  of  Mexican  exports  to the  US price
index.
10The  exogenous  savings  rate  is imposed  in order that consumers  have a
demand  for  bonds  in  the  final  period.  Otherwise  all  outstanding  debt  would  have
to  be  paid  off  and,  in  particular,  the  entire  stock  of  public  debt  would  have  to
be  liquidated.
1lConsumption  weights  for  domeotic  goods  are  derived  from  Matriz  de
Insumo-Producto  Anno  (1978)  (1983),  Table  1,  while  the  weights  for  imports  came
from  the  same  source,  T&ble  5.
12These  shares  are  derived  from  Sistema  de  Cuentas  Consolidades  de  la  Nacion
(1985),  Table  69,  where  we  have  used  1982  shares  in  exports.- 12 -
(c)  U - US nominal GNP.
The figures  in parenthesis  are  t-statistics.  We notice  that US GNP and  the
lagged  dependent  variable are significant,  and  that  the  long-run  elasticities
all  have  the  correct  signs. The  long  run  relative  price  elasticity  is  4.4,  while
that  of US GNP is 2..13  Finally,  we did  not  attempt  to estimate  an oil  export
equatLon,  and  oil  exports  were  taken  to be exogenous.
Two  other  equation estimations  are  needed to close  the  determination  of
consumption. A money demand  equatLon  was estimated  using  annual  data for  the
period  1950-1985.  We  wish  to  estimate  an  equation  of  the  forms
log  d  al +  a  log  C2+ a r,  where  (7)
log M - log M_1 - B(log Md _ log M).
Here  we define
(a) Md - desired  stock  of  money
(b) M  - money  supply
.c)  C  - nominal  consumption
(d)  r  - domestic  interest  rate
(e)  b - an adjustment  parameter  representing  the speed  of
adjustment  of actual  to desired  stock.
In  order  to maintain  homogeneity  in  consumptLon,  as required  in the
general  equilibrium  model, 14 we set  at  =  1 and  obtain
log  M/C  - a  a0 + a  a2r  + (1  - B) log  M_ 1/C.  (8)
13Thus  in  estimation  we treat  the  relative  price  index  as being  exogenous,
although  in  the general  equilibrium  model  it is  an endogenous  variable.
14A  uniform increase  ln the price level  cannot  have an effect  on excess
demand,  as  would  be the  case  if  a,  -1,  if  we are  to demonstrate  the  existence  of
an equilibrium.- 13 -
Equation  (8)  was  estimated  over  the  period  1950-1985  using  MI for  money  and
replacing r by  I,  the inflation  rate in the wholesale price index. 15 The
results  are
log M/C - -0.37 - 0.23 r + 0.83 log M_/C.  (9)
(-0.41)  (-3.71) (7.21)
R2 . 0.65  D.W. =  1.88
We  may  then  identify  the  underlying  parameters  as
a0 - -2.18, al - 1, a2 - -1.35,  3  - 0.17.  (10)
so  that  the  demand  for  money  function  given  in  equation  (7)  is
M - 0.113  r 1.35C.  (11)
We  must  also  estimate  the  portfolio  balance  equation  given  in  equation  (5c).
log (xd/xf) - bo + b1(e - e_ 1 ) + b2 log (xd/xf  ),  (12)
where  xd,  xf  represent  the  peso  value  of  domestic  and  foreign  asset  holdings  by
Mexican  consumers,  respectively,  and  e is  the  peso/USS  exchange  rate. This  was
estimated  over  the  period  1970-1985  with  annual  data  taken  from  Zedillo  (1986),
since  there  is  no  information on  capital  flight  prior  to  1970.
log (xd/xf) - 0.28 - 0.72 (e - e_,) + 0.45 (xd/xf)  (13)
(2.79)  (-3.00)  (2.79)
R2 - 0.74  D.W. - 2.48
We  thus  note  that  all  parameters  are  significant  and  have  the  correct  sign.
We  tried  a  number  of  different  specifications  of  the  portfolio  balance  equation,
attempting  to determine  an impact  of relative  interest  rates.  In none of the
tests  did  we find  interest  rates  to  be  significant,  however,  probably  reflecting
the  controls  that  were  in  place  on  Mexican  interest  rates  for  much  of the  sample
period.
1 'This was done because interest  rates  were controlled  for much of our
sample  period  and hence do not reflect  true opportunity  costs.  Our general
equilibrium  model,  however,  uses  r.- 14 -
For  our  current  application  we  also  require  some  estimate  of  the  elasticity
of rural/urban  migration. We  have  therefore  used  data  from  the  period  1970-1982
to estimate  snuation  (Sd). The resulting  parameters  are
log (X.,/Li)  - 2.43  +  S.00 log  {PLW - PL-Li/(PLui  +  PLz}  (14)
(5.26)  (3.45)
R2 - 0.54  D.W. - 1.21
Thus  we see  that  the elasticity  of substitution  of urban  and  rural  labor
with respect  to the relative  wage rate  is S.0,  a relatively  high figure. This
probably  reflects  the  period  of  the  sample,  when  urban  wages  were  rising  rapidly
in  response  to  oil  price  increases,  and  there  were  large  movements  of labor  from
the country  to the  city.
c.  Trensfer  Payments  and  Government  Financina
The  government  collects  income,  profit,  and  sales  taxes,  as  well  as import
duties, and pays subsidies,  and, implicitly,  pays investment  tax credits,
depreciation  allowances,  and  employment  tax  credits.  In  addition,  the  government
must cover  both domestic  and  foreign  interest  obligations  on public  debt.  The
deficit  of the central  government  in period  1,  D1, is then  given  bys
D-  GI +  S1 +  riBo  +  elrFlBFO  - T1 (15)
where SI  represents  subsidies,  including  tax credits,  given  in  period  1,  Ga is
spending  on  goods  and  services,  while  the  other  two  terms  reflect  domestic  and
foreign  interest  obligations  of  the  government,  based  on  its  initial  stocks  of
debt.  Thus,  for  example,  policies  that cause  the exchange  rate to depreciate
will increase  foreign  interest  payments. T1 represents  total revenues  of the
government.
There  are  several  types  of  subsidies  that  the  government  may  use  either  to
support  consumption  or  production.  The  first  of  these  is  a  support  to  value
added  of the sector  in question  given  by:
tac PKayja+PIiya)  (16)
where  tad  is  the  support  rate  given  to  the  sector's  value  added  in  period  i  and
the  term  in  parenthesis  is  the  nominal  cost  of  the  sector's  value  added.  The- 15 -
second type of subsLdy is a guaranteed  prLce to sectoral  output.  Here the
government  announces  a support  price for the aector's  output.  If the market
price  falls  below  thls  support,  then  some  fractLon  of the  dlfference  ia  made  up
by the  government  as  a direct  subsidy  to producers. Hence  the support  payments
are  glven  bys
(P  u  P )ya  (17)
where  P*aj  is  the  target  prlce  of output. If  the  term ln (17)  ls negatlve,  then
no subsidy  is  paid.
A thlrd  possible  subsidy  le  a support  paid  to consumption  of  the sector's
products. Here we suppose  that  the government  announces  a maximum  price,  P",
for consumptlon. If the  market  prlce  of sectoral  output  rises above  this ln
perlod  i,  then some  fraction  of the  difference,  fi,  ia paid by the government,
thereby  reduclng  the  effective  prlce  to  consumers.  Accordingly,  the  payment  made
for  thls is glven  by:
Efi(P*ai  - Pci)xai  (18)
where  xai  is  the total  prlvate  consumption  of sectoral  output  ln period  i.
The resulting  deflcit  is financed  by a comblnation  of monetization  and
domestic  and foreign  borrowing.  Thus if yBflI  represents  the face value of
domestic  bonds  sold  by  the  government  in  period  1,  and  CF1  represents  the  dollar
value  of its  foreign  borrowing,  then  its  budget  deficit  in  period  2  is  given  by:
D2  =G2  +  2  +  r 2 (yBG 0 +BO)  +e2 rF 2 (CFl+BFO)  - T.  (19)
where  r2 (yBG1  + BO)  represents  the  interest  obligations  on its initial  domestlc
debt  plus  borrowlng  from  period  1,  and  e2rF2(CFI+BO)  is the interest  payment  on
the initial  stock  of foreign  debt  plus  period  1 foreign  borrowing.
d.  The  Foreian  Sector  and  Exchance  Rate Determination
The foreign  sector  is represented  by a simple  export  equation  in which
aggregate  demand  for  non-oil  exports  is  determined  by  domestic  and  foreign  price
indices,  as  well as world income. Hence  the  foreign  currency  value  of non-oil
exports  is  sensitive  to changes  in  the  exchange  rate  as  well  as  to  domestic  price- 16 -
changes. We  take  the  dollar  value  of oil  exports  to be  exogenous. The  specific
form  of the  non-oil  export  equation  is:
- Xno - ol{ri/(O  eiffi))  +  026  Ywi  (20)
where  the left hand side  of the equation  represents  the change  in the dollar
value  of Mexican  non-oil  exports  in period  i, ir  is inflation  in the domestic
price  index,  a  ei  is  the percentage  change  in the  exchange  rate,  and  IFFi  is  the
foreign  rate  of inflation. Also  o  Ywi  represents  the  percentage  change  in  world
income, denominated in  dollars.  Finally, a, and  °2  are  corresponding
elasticities. It is then assumed  that the rest of the world spends  constant
shares  on each Mexican non-oil  export.  Thus equation  (20) determines  total
spending  on non-oil  exports,  and Mexican  prices  determine  the volume  of each
export. The  parameter  values  used  to determine  equation  (20)  are  derived  from
the long-run  values  of the  parameter  estimates  in  equation  (6).
The  combination  of the  export  equation  and  domestic  supply  responses  then
determines  aggregate  exports. Demand  for  imports  is  endogenous  and is derived
from  the  domestic  consumers,  maximization  problems,  which  also  determine  their
demand  for  foreign  assets. Foreign  lending  has  not  been  modelled,  but  has  been
taken  to  be  exogenous.  Thus  gross  capital  inflows  are  exogenous,  but  the  overall
change  in  reserves  is  endogenous,  depending  upon  savings  behavior  and  demand  for
imports  of consumers.
Apart from  producing  infrastructure,  collecting  taxes,  and financing  the
budget  deficit,  the government  also attempts  to adjust  the exchange  rate.  The
supply  of foreign  reserves  yFGi,  available  to  the  government  in  period  i  is  given
by:
YFGi - YFG(i-1)  +  Xi  - Mi  +  xF(iW) - xFi  +  CFi  (21)
Here  xFi  represents  the demand for foreign assets by citizens  of the home
country, so xF(O 1) - xFi  represents  private capital flows.  CFi  represents
exogenous  foreign  borrowing  by the home  government.- 17 -
All  terms on the right hand side of equation  (21) are solved  from the
maximization problems of the  domestic and foreign  consumers.  The government also
has a demand for  assets which, we suppose is  determined by an exchange rate rule.
Consider Diagram 1 representing the government's exchange rate rule in  period i.
The  horizontal  axis  represents  the  market  exchange  rate in period i,  ei,  while
the vertical axis represents the government's demand for foreign assets.  In
addition,  let xFi  represent whatever the government feels to be the critical
level of  foreign  reserves  in period  i.  This  critical  level  is determined
exogenously.
Let us suppose that the exchange rate in period i depreciates  from the
previous period.  Hence ei  >  ei_..  Then, as in the diagram, we derive a unique
government demand for reserves, xFGi,  in  the diagram.  Equivalently, if  there is
a slight decrease in  the equilibrium supply  of foreign reserves of  the government
below  its  critical  level, then there is a sharp depreciation in the exchange
rate.  We  may  then  construct  excess  demand  by  the  government  for  foreign
reserves, Dpi,  as
DFi  '  xFGi  - YFGi
Thus  the  government  creates  a  correspondence  between  changes  in the
exchange  rate  and  movements  away  from  the  critical  level  of  reserves.  If,  as  an
extreme  case,  the  graph  in Diagram  1  becomes  horizontal  at  xFi, then  this
corresponds  to  a  pure  float  when reserves fall to their critical level.  This is
the  scenario  of  much  of  the balance of payments crisis literature.16 A graph
that  is  close  to  horizontal  below  xFi  may  be  taken  as  representing the policy of
a  nervous  government,  while  a graph  that  is closer  to  vertical  reflects  a
relatively  unconcerned  policy.
4.  Simulation  Results
a.  Calibration
16 See,  for  example,  Obstefeld  (1984,  1986)  or  Krugman  (1979).- 18  -
The primary  goal of our study  is to be able  to make certain  quantitative
judgments  concerning  the  impact  of  changes  in  fiscal  parameters  on domestic  real
and financial  variables. We wish to first  simulate  the  model for  the two  year
period 1987-88,  the most recent  years for  which we have comparable  data.  In
order to simulate the estimated form of our model, we have taken initial
allocations  to be the stocks  at  the  end  of 1986. Thus  a unit  of urban  or rural
labor,  for  example,  is taken  to be that quantity  which earned  1 peso in 1986.
A unit  of capital  ia  that amount  which  earned  a  rent  of 1  peso in 1986,  as is  a
unit  of land. Stocks  of  money,  bonds,  and  foreign  bonds  are  taken  to have  their
actual  values  at the  end  of 1986.  The  model  ie solved  using  a program  written
by the author that computes  a fixed point of the intertemporal  model.  The
program,  as well as the corresponding  data set  which incorporates  all initial
stocks  and  estimated  parameters,  is  available  upon  request  from  the authors.
As  a  first  experiment  we  wish  to see  how  well  our  model  replicates  reality.
We  thus  carry  out  a  simulation  for  1987-88  in  which  all  exogenous  parameters  take
on their  actual  hlstorical  values  for  those  years.  In  particular,  we take  oil
exports to have take their actual values.  We have attempted  to estimate
effective  rates  for  all  taxes  and  tariffs, 17 and  have taken  the real  values  of
government  spending  to be the actual values in each year.  In particular,
Lnvestment  tax credits  are  uniformly  set  at 10  percent,  as are  employment  tax
credits. We have  set  the  desired  level  of foreign  reserves  of the  government  at
0, and  we have set  the slope  of devaluation  at 4 when reserves  fall  below  the
desired  level,  that  is,  if  the  government  has  negative  net  reserves. If  reserves
rise  above  0,  then  the slope  of revaluation  is  set  at 2.  Clearly  these  numbers
are  arbitrary  and  in reality  would  be subject  to constant  change. Nonetheless
the figures  chosen  serve  as the basis for comparison. Finally,  we will also
suppose  that  there  are  no  supports  paid  for  either  for  production  or  consumption.
We  will  experiment  in  later  simulations  with  tax  credits. The  resulting  outcome
is  given in  Table  4.1.
17These are derived from recent  work carried  out by the World Bank in
Mexlco.- 19  -
Table 4.1:  BenchmArk Simulation
(the numbers in parenthesio are historical values)*/
1987  -- 19§8-
Nominal GDP a/  192.9  (192.9)  366.0  (397.6)
Real GDP b/  48.0  (48.0)  49.9  (48.5)
Government spending a/  45.9  (55.1)  102.4  (94.7)
Revenues a/  28.1  (28.8)  57.6  (56.4)
Government budget deficit  -17.8  (-26.3)  -44.8  (-38.3)
Exports a/  20.8  (28.9)  47.4  (47.2)
Imports a/  12.4  (18.0)  25.4  (42.1)
Trade balance a/  8.4  (10.9)  22.0  (5.1)
Inflation rrate  c/  135.6  (135.6)  82.4  (107.8)
Interest rate d/  103.1  (103.1)  81.6  (62.0)
Exchange rate e/  1025.7 (1025.7)  2111.7 (2249.4)
Real exchange rate f/  100.0  (100.0)  88.4  (94.8)









*7  our data sources for historical values are Cuentas Nacionales de Mexico,
international Financial Statistics, and various accounts made available by
the Mexico division of the World Bank.
a/  In 1000 x billions of pesos.
b/  In 1000 x billions of 1980 pesos.
ce  Rate of inflation in the wholesale price index.
d/  Interest rates are annual percentage rates for 3-months treasury bills.
es  In pesos/USS.
f/  Defined  as WPI/e  where WPI  is the wholesale  price  index and e  is the
nominal exchange rate.
g/  In billions of US$.
h/  These  are  index numbers which we will use  to make  comparisons when we
calculate the effects of introducing investment and employment tax credits.- 20 -
Let us make some observations concerning the calibration of our model.
1.  Nominal GDP is calculated as C +  I +  G +  X - M.  To calculate real GDP we
use the GDP deflator, calculated as the price index'of  value added (this is  very
close to the wholesale price index).  Thus nominal GDP in 1988 is seen to be
below  its actual values since we underestimate the rate of inflation in that
year.  We overestimate the growth rate in 1988 real GDP by about 3.0 percentage
points.
2.  Tax revenues are the sum  of VAT, sales, and excise taxes, along with profit
and income taxes, and tariffs.  These correspond to the revenues of the Federal
Government and do  thus not represent as  broad a coverage as  given in  the accounts
of consolidated public sector.  In  particular, we do not include  non-tax revenue
or sales of public enterprises.  Direct taxes are the corporate and personal
income  taxes, while indirect  taxes are the  VAT, sales, and excise taxes.  We thus
see that the simulated aggregate tax collections are good approximations of the
actual Mexican numbers.
3.  Expenditure represents expenditure of the Federal Government and therefore
does not include public enterprises.  In  particular, the figures  we have  used for
actual  expenditures  are derived  as the  sum of  1) Federal  wages,  2)Federal
purchases of  goods and services, 3)Current  transfers from  the Federal  Government,
not  including  transfer  payments  to  state  enterprises,1 8 4)  Federal  capital
expenditure, 5) Total interest payments.  We have treated public enterprises  in
our consolidation as being tax-paying private firms.  We note that in 1987 we
slightly underestimate expenditures, possibly because we are not attributing the
full debt obligations that the government actually had as an initial stock.  In
1988,  on the other hand, expenditures have risen above their actual value.  This
is largely because the simulated 1988 interest rate is higher than its actual
value,  causing  government  debt  service  to  be  higher  than  in  reality.
Accordingly, we over-estimate the size of the government's budget deficit in
1988.
18We do  not include transfer payment to  state enterpr.ses  since  in our
simulations we treat state  enterprises as  being part of the  private sector.  They
are thus profit maximizing and do not receive transfers.- 21 -
4.  The aggregate  value of exports, in terms of domestic currency,  under-
predicts  the actual  amount  for  1987  and  becomes  more accurate  in 1988.  Recall
that we generate  exports from an export equation in which oil exports are
exogenous in dollar terms and non-oil exports are endogenous depending on
endogenous  relative  domestic  and foreign  prices,  as well as exogenous  foreign
income. Simulated  imports  are  underestimated  in both  years,  and  more severely
underestimated  in 1988.  As a result, the domestic currency value of the
simulated  trade balance  in is overestimated  in 1988.  This is primarily  the
result  of the simulated  real exchange  rate depreciating  more rapidly in the
simulated  outcome  than in realLty.
6.  The  inflatLon  and  nominal  interest  rate  movements  have  the  correct  direction
of change, although  the decline  in inflation  is over-estimated. For actual
values  we  have  taken  annual  averages  of  the  corresponding  indices.  For  inflation
we use  the wholesale  price  index,  while  for  interest  rates  we use the  treasury
bill  rate  given  in  International  Financial  Statistics.  The  simulated  figures  for
1987 are calibrated  to the actual rates, since no rate of change can be
calculated  in  the  first  year. In  1988  we see  that  our  model  generates  a  slightly
positive  real interest  rate,  as compared  to an actual  45 percent  negative  real
rate.
7.  The  nominal exchange rate depreciates slightly less rapidly in  the
simulation  than in  reality. 19 Recall, however,  that our choices for the
critical  level  of foreign  reserves  as well as for  the  depreciation  rules  shown
in  Figure  1  are  essentially  arbitrary. Actually  the  Mexican  government  does  not
follow  a  single  exchange  rate  rule  for  two  years,  and  may  oppose  devaluation  more
strongly  than our rule indicates.  We also show a somewhat  more rapid real
devaluation  between  the  two  periods  than  actually  occurred. This is  mainly  due
to the  higher  than actual  simulated  rate  of inflation.
We thus note that our model seems to generate a reasonably accurate
replication  of actual  Mexican  outcomes  for  1987-88. It  does  therefore  not  seem
19We &re using the average exchange  rates for Ql 1987 and Ql 1988 to
represent  actual  nominal  exchange  rates.- 22 -
unreasonable  to use  the  behavioral  structure  of the  model  to carry  out  counter-
factual  simulations.
b.  Cognterfactual  Simulation.
(i)  Investment  Tax Credit  Increase
First,  we simulate  the effects  of introducing  a uniform increase  in the
investment  tax credit for all the sectors  that use capital as an input to
production. Recall  that  agriculture  uues  land  and  rural  labor  as inputs,  while
imports  do not  use physical  inputs. Accordingly,  we will suppose  that sectors
2-6  are  each  now  given  a  20  percent  investment  tax  credit. All  other  parameters
in the simulation  remain  unchanged  from the exercise  reported  in Table 4.1.
Table  4.2  gives  the  resulting  outcomes.
We thus  notice  that  the  20  percent  investment  tax  credit  has  brought  about
a  rise in the rate of inflation  in both periods,  as compared  with Table  4.1.
This increase  has been largely  caused  by the rise in the government  budget
deficit,  both in nominal  terms  and as a percentage  of GDP.  Accordingly,  the
aggregate  loss  of reserves  by the Central  Bank is  greater  in this case  than in
the  initial simulation.  We  see  that the  real interest rate has  risen
significantly  in  both  periods,  in response  to the  incr.ssed  budget  deficits.  In
addition,  real exchange  rates has depreciated,  leadii;  consumers  to decrease
their holdings of domestic debt, as compared to the  case of Table 4.1.
Accordingly,  the  price  of domatic  debt falls,  leading  to a further  increase  in
the  real interest  rate.  Thus,  we see  that  there  have  been  uniform  increases  in
the rates  of net real capital  formations  across  sectors. These increases  are
somewhat  less  than  might  be expected,  as  the  increased  real  interest  rates  tend
to  mitigate  the  positive  effects  of the  investment  incentives.  Because  factors
are transferred  from current to capital  production,  there have been slight
declines  in real  GDP in both  periods,  as our  model's  time horizon  is not long
enough  to fully  incorporate  the  effects  of the  increased  sectoral  capital.
(ii) CorMorate  Income  Tax  Rate  Reduction
Since  a  20  percent  investment  tax  credit  seems  to  offor  some  stimulus
to capital  formation,  but also seems  to have  certain  adverse  macroeconomic- 23 -
Table  4.2:  Impact  of a  20 Dercent  Investment  Tax  Credit
1987  1988
Nominal  ODP a/  211.1  432.6
Real GDP  b/  47.6  49.0
Government  spendlng  a/  50.8  121.7
Revenues  a/  30.8  67.8
Government  budget  deficit  -20.0  -53.9
Exports  a/  22.0  57.5
Imports  a/  13.5  29.9
Trade  balance  a/  8.5  27.6
Inflation  rate  c/  159.8  99.3
Interest  rate  d/  148.4  114.4
Exchange  rate  e/  1084.9  2531.4
Real  exchange  rate f/  95.9  81.9
Change  in reserves  g/  -1.3  -4.4
Net  real capital







a/  in  1000  x  billions  of  pesos.
b/  In 1000  x  billions  of  1980  pesos.
c/  Rate of inflation  in  the  wholesale  price  index.
d/  In  percent.
e/  In  pesos/US$.
f/  Defined as WPI/e where WPI is the wholesale  price index and e is the
nominal  exchange  rate.
g/  In billiono  of US$.
h/  Index  numbers  based  on  the  corresponding  levels  of investment  in  Table  4.1- 24 -
offects, let us now suppose that the government  attempts to generate an
investment  increase  by reducing  the tax rate  on capital  income. We will thus
suppose  that  the  statutory  tax  rate  on  capital  income  is lowered  from  42  percent
to 35 percent. The resulting  outcomes  are  given  in  Table  4.3.
We observe that this change has had rather unexpected  outcomes.  In
particular, we  see  that  the  rate  of  capital  formation has  increased
significantly,  as compared  to Table 4.2.  The reasons for this outcome are
straightforward.  The  budget  deficit  of  the  central  government  was  9.47  percent
of GDP in 1987  and 12.46  percent  of GDP in 1988 in the simulation  reported  in
Table  4.2.  In  Table  4.3  the  corresponding  figures  are  9.87 and  12.08  percent.
Thus,  over  the  two  years  of the  simulation,  the  reduction  in  the  capital  income
tax rate has had approximately  the same aggregate  effect on the real budget
deficit  as  did  raising  the investment  tax  credit. The  reduction  in the  capital
tax rate,  on the other  hand,  has had the effect  of sharply  lowering  the real
interest  rate,  unlike  the previous  example  when  real interest  rates rose.  The
reason  for  this  change  comes  from  the  behaviour  of  the  real  exchange  rate.  Here,
there  is  an  appreciation  in  the  real  exchange  rate,  as  compared  to  Table  4.2,  as
the relative  value  of domestic  capital  rises  in response  to the  capital  income
tax reduction,  which  affects  the  entire  capital  stock.  Accordingly,  the  public
increases  its  holdings  of domestic  debt,  causing  the  price  of  domestic  bonds  to
rise  and  the  real interest  rate  to fall. Accordingly,  the  incentive  offered  by
the capital  income  tax cut  lowers  the  cost  of capital  but  does  not  increase  the
cost  of borrowing,  as  did  the  investment  tax credits. In  addition,  the  tax  cut
brings  about  lower  inflation  rates  and  lower  losses  in  foreign  reserves  than  do
the  investment  tax  credits.  Accordingly,  under  such  circumstances,  tax  cuts  seem
to be superior  to investment  tax credits  in stimulating  investment.- 25 -
Table 4.3:  Imoact of a Reduction in the CaoLtAl Income Tax Rate
1987  1988
Nominal GDP a/  196.5  374.1
Real GDP b/  48.0  49.7
Government spending a/  46.7  103.8
Revenues a/  27.3  58.6
Government budget deficit  -19.4  -45.2
Exports a/  19.5  49.4
Imports a/  12.5  25.9
Trade balance a/  7.0  23.5
Inflation rate c/  140.0  84.0
Interest rate d/  93.2  79.9
Exchange rate e/  960.0  2143.5
Real exchange rate f/  108.7  96.0









a/  In 1000 x billions of pesos.
b/  In 1000 x billions of 1980 pesos.
c/  Rate of inflation in the wholesale price index.
d/  In percent.
e/  In pesos/US$.
f/  Defined  as WPI/e where  WPI  is the wholesale  price  index and e iS  the
nominal exchange rate.
g/  In billions of US$.
h/  Index numbers  based on the corresponding levels of investment in  Table 4.1- 26 -
(iii) Zmolovment  Tax  Credit  Chanas
Finally,  let  us suppose  that  the  government  attempts  to  use  employment tax
credlts rather than lnvestment  tax  credits as a  pollcy  inetrument.  In
partliular,  we  will  look  at a  program  Ln  which  the  10  percent  lnvestment  tax
credit  from  the  base  case  is  malntalned.  The  employment  tax  cred.t  le  raised  so
that the  overall  deficit  implications  are  the same as in simulation  4.2,  when
investment  tax  credits  were  increased.  Capital  tax  rates  are  maintained  at  their
level  of the  base simulation  of Table  4.1  We can  not solve  analytically  for  a
employment tax  credlt  that  gives  preclsely  the  same  budgetary  outcome  as  ln  Table
4.2.  Rather,  we  search  for  employment  tax  credlt  rates  that  result  in
approximately  that outcome.  It turns out that a  3 percent Lncrease  in the
employment  tax credlt,  that le,  an employment  tax credlt  of 13 percent,  yLelds
the followlng  budget  neutral  outcome.
We thus observe  that the new regLme leads  to budget deficLts  that are
almost  ldentlcal,  both in  nominal  and real  terms,  to those of Table 4.2.  The
real outcomes  of thli scenarlo  are  dlfferent,  however.  In partleular,  we see
that,  wlth the  exceptlon  of the transportation  sector,  all sectors  have lower
rates  of capltal  formatlon  ln  thli  case  that  ln Table  4.2. They  thus  also  have
consLderably  lower  rates  of capltal  formatlon  than ln  Table  4.3,  the  slmulatlon
that incorporates  reduced  capLtal  tax rates.  We thus agaLn conclude  that a
reductlon  ln  the  capltal  income  tax  rate le  suporlor  ln  promotlng  Lnvestment  to
elther  employment  or investment  tax credlts.- 27 -
Table 4.4:  1987-88 Assumina a  10 percent Investment Tax Credit
and a 13 Percent EmploQment Tax Credit
1987  1988
Nominal GDP a/  213.0  431.1
Real GDP b/  48.0  48.8
Government spending a/  51.0  121.4
Revenues a/  30.9  67.7
Government budget deficit  -20.2  -53.7
Exports a/  22.1  57.6
Imports a/  13.6  29.7
Trade balance a/  8.5  27.9
Inflation rate c/  149.8  99.1
Interest rate d/  115.5  90.5
Exchange rate e/  1086.7  2529.2
Real exchange rate f/  104.3  89.2









a/  In 1000 x  billions of pesos.
b/  In 1000 x billLons of 1980 pesos.
c/  Rate of inflation in the wholesale price index.
d/  In percent.
aj  In pesos/US$.
f/  Defined  as WPI/e where WPI  is the wholesale  price  lndex and e  is the
nominal exchange rate.
g/  In billions of US$.
h/  Index numbers based on the corresponding levels of investment in Table 4.1- 28  -
SummarY  and Conclusion
We have  constructed  an  intertemporal  general  equilibrium  model  designed  to
examine  certain  fiscal  policies  that  have  direct  impactc  upon investment  and
employment.  In  particular,  we consider  sectoral  investment  tax  credits,  as  well
as  uniform  employment  credits.  The  model  also  permits  the  consideration  of  price
and  consumption  subsidies,  and  can  easily  be  extended  to  other  policies  affecting
investment. Among  these  are accelerated  depreciation  allowances  and immediate
full  expensing.
We  have  developed  a  methodology  for  solving  the  model  numerically  and  have
applied  the  model  to  Mexico. We first  attempt  to replicate  the  actual  outcomes
of 1987-88,  and  then  turn  to  a series  of counter-factual  simulations. We first
compare  the  offects  of  doubling  the  lnvestment  tax  credit  with  those  of an  equal
yield  16.7  percent  decrease  in  the  capital  income  tax  rate. We observe  that  the
overall  budgetary  implications  of  the  two  policies  are  approximately  equivalent.
The  capital  income  tax  reduction,  however,  directly  lowers  the cost  of capital,
thereby  reducing  the  real  interest  rate  and  hence  increasing  the  rate  of  capital
formation,  relative  to  the  case  with  investment  tax  credit  increases.
Accordlngly,  it appears  in  this  case  that  capital  income  tax  reductions  are  more
effective ln stimulating  investment  than are investment  tax credits.  This
example also indicates  that simply  examining  the budgetary implications  of
different  investment  policies  is  not sufficient  to predict  their  outcomes.
Finally,  we look at the effects  of a  budget neutral  reduction in the
employment  tax credit. We find  that this  policy  is inferior  to either  of the
other two in promoting  capital  formation. We conclude  that, at least in the
Mexican  case,  capital  Income  tax  reductions  policy  seems  to  be  rather  effective.
We also  note the importance  of using  an intertemporal  model,  since  investment
decisions  are, of course,  fo:ward-looking. We also observe  that investment
policLes effects different sectors in  a  non-uniform  way,  indicating the
importance  of using  sector-specific  capital  in our  model.- 29 -
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Appendlx  As
Corporate  Structure  and  Investment  Incentives  Ln  Mexico
The  structure  of  corporate  Lncome  taxatlon  Ln  MaxLco  has  undergone  major
changes  slnce  early  1987.  In  the  following,  current  tax  structure  is  described
wlth  occasional  references  to  pre-1987  tax  system.
Corporate  Income  Tax  Basm and  Rates  Corporate  Lacome  tax  base  is  now
completely  lndexed.  Taxable  Profits  (defLned  as  gross  receLptu  mlnus  costs,
business  expenses,  dlvldends  corresponding  to  prevLous  perlod  of  earnLngs  and  net
louses  carrled  forward  from  other  perlod.)  are  subject  to  tax  at  a  rate  of  35%
(a  rate  of 42%  provaLled  ln  the  pro-1987  perLod). Depreclatlon  deductlons  are
lndexed  or as an alternative,  the  present  value  of  deprecLation  calculated  at a
dlicount rate of 7.5% may be deducted fully ln all regLons except major
metropolltan areas and  in all  sectors except the  automobiles.  In major
metropolltan  areas  only  60%  of such  value  can  be deducted  ln  the first  year  and
the remaining  40% subjected  to  capital  consumptLon  allowances.
Asset  Taxt  An assets  tax at a rate  of 2% of the average  value  of assets
of business  enterprLses  and credltable  agaLnst  thelr lncome  tax liabilLty  Ln
MexLco  is levLed  effectlve  ln 1989.
Taxation of Corporate  Income.  The  corporate  Lncome tax  base  is  now
indexed.  Taxable profits (defined  as gross recelpts  mLnus costs, busLness
expenses,  dLvidends  correspondlng  to  prevlous  periods  of  earnings,  and  net  losses
carrled  forward  from  other  perlods)  are  taxed  at  a  rate  of  35  percent  (a  rate  of
42  percent  provaLled  before  1987). DeprecLatLon  deductlons  are  lndexed,  or, as
an alternatlve,  the  present  value  of depreclatlon  calculated  at a  dlicount  rate
of 7.5  percent  may be deducted  fully  ln all  regLons  except  large  metropolltan
areas  and  ln  all  sectors  except  the  automoblIe  lndustry.  In  metropolLtan  areas,
only  60  percent  of  such  value  can  be  deducted  Ln  the  flrst  year  and  the  remaLnLng
40  percent  subject  to  capltal  consumptLon  allowances.- 31 -
Dividend  Income. Starting  in  1989,  dividends  were  no  longer  deductible  by
the  corporation  distributing  them  nor  could  they  be included  in  the  gross  income
of  the  recipient.  The  withholding  tax  on  dividend  distributions  varies  with  the
source  (whether  or  not  paid  from  accumulated  earnlngs  already  taxed--the  net  tax
profit  account--or  paid  from  untaxed  other  sources)  and  with  the  tax  regime  faced
by the  recipient,  as follows:
Withholding  Tax  Rate
on Dividends  Paid (%)
From  the net
tax  profit  From  other
Recipient  account  sources
Individuals  or nonprofit  organizations,
resident  or nonresident  in  Mexico  10  40
Resident  corporations  None  35
Foreign  corporationst
Home  tax rate  on forelgn  dividend
income  at 30 percent  or more  None  35
Home  tax rate  on foreign  dividend
income  at les  than  30 percent  10  40
Interest  Income  and  Royalties.  Beginning  in  1991,  the  withholding  tax  rate
on interest  income  will be 35 percent  and the rate on payments  for  technical
assistance,  know-how,  the  transfer  of  technology,  and  fees  paid  to nonresidents
(including  royalties  for  patents  when  licensed  in  connection  with  the  rendering
of technical  assistance)  will be 21 percent.  Payments  for the use of other
royalties  such  as for  the licensing  of trade  marks  or trade  names,  or patents
without  the rendering  of technical  assistance,  will taxed  at 40  percent.
Goods in Bonded  Warehouses. These  goods  are subject  to a 3 percent  tax
either  on  the  value  on  which  import  duties  are  assessed  or  on  the  declared  value,
whichever  is greater.
Profit  Sharing. All  businesses  in  Mexico  are  obliged  to share  10  percent
of their  profits  wlth employees.- 32  -
Social  Security  and  Payroll  Taxes. Employers  are  obliged  to  contribute  to
social  security  coverage  for workers (11  percent of workers'  weekly wages),
children's  nurseries  (1  percent  of wages),  and  an occupational  risk  fund (from
5  to  167  percent  of  wages). In  addition,  employers  contribute  5  percent  of  wage.
to the  National  Housing  Fund  and 1  percent  of wages  in support  of education.
Value  Added  Tax. The  general  15  percent  rate  of  the  value  added  tax (VAT)
in applicable  to all  transactions  concluded  in  the  border  and  free  zones.
Assets  Tax. An assets  tax  et a rate  of  2 percent  of the  average  value  of
total assets  of business  enterprises  and creditable  against  thelr income  tax
liability  in  Mexico,  is levied  effective  in 1989.
Tax  incentives  regime  in  Mexico  has  undergoe  significant  changes  over  time.
These  are  briefly  discussed  belowt
1955-1972:  Between  20% (for  secondary  industries)  and 40% (for  basic
industries)  corporate  income  of  Mexican  majority  owned  enterprises  was  exempted
from  corporate  taxation  for  periods  varying  between  five  to  ten  years.  The  same
industries  also  could  receive,  upon  application,  exemption  from  certain  indirect
taxes  and  import  duties  on  capital  goods  imports.
1972-1979t  Industries  that  were  seen  to  promote  decentralization  and
regional  development  were  granted  import  duties  relief  varying  from  50% to  100%
and  reduction  in  corporate  tax  liability  ranging  from  10% to  40% depending  upon
their  location  and  type  of  activity.
1979-1986:  The practice  of import  duty exemption  was continued.  In
addition,  tax incentives  certificates  (CEPROFIS)  providing  tax credit  in the
range  of  10-25%,  depending  upon  location,  and  type  and  size  of  the  industry,  for
investment  in  physical assets were introduced.  These certificates were
negotiable  and  could  be used  against  any  federal  tax  liability  by the  holder.
1986-Presents The tax incentives  certificates  scheme  was significantly
tightened  and targeted  to priority  industries  and prefered  zone (See  Appendix
Table  Al).  Top  tax  credit  rate for  CEPROFI  was  raised  to 40%  of total  physical
investment  in 1986.  In addition  Mexican-owned  enterprises  are eligible  for
employment  tax  credit  up  to  30% of  three  times  the  annual  area  minimum  wage- 33 -
multiplied  by  the  number  of  new  jobs  created. in  additlon,  full  expensing  of  the
present  value  of capital  consumption  allowances  calculated  using  a  7.5%  discount
rate  was  allowed  in non-metropolitan  areas. In  the  metropolitan  industrialLzed
areas  of Mexico  City,  D.F.,  Monterrey  and  Guadalajara,  only 60%  of the  present
value of depreciation  allowances  could  be deducted  in the first year.  R&D
investment  tax  credit  at 15%  for  the  purchase  of  technological  research  (20%  for
small  and micro enterprises),  and 20% for capital  purchases  by technologLeal
enterprises  (30%  for  small  and  micro  enterprises)  are  currently  permlaisble.
A summary  view  of  the  taxation  of  business  income  is  given  in  Table  A2 and
details  regarding  forgone  revenues  due  to  fiscal  incentives  are  repeated  in  Table
A3-A-ll.- 34  -
Tabk Al
Mccico: Tax Cedts  for lvestmeat  (CEFROFJS)  1988
ZONES  1  2  3
Low  Pdoriv
of hghes  of hihs  A.-  are: of  B: ae  of
tutionl  - controled  comoid
Beneficiary  -zi  Prioity  -1  tion  ing  zones
Categozy  1  30%  20%  none  nonc  15% Category  2  20%  15%  none  none  10%
Small industry  30%  30%  none  20%  20%
Mieronuslry  40%  40%  none  30%  30%
Souree:  1988  Inteational  Bureau  of Fsa  D  n_,  Suppknent No. 71,
june 1988.- 35  -
Table A2
Mexico:  Taxatifn of Business  Income,  A Caearative Perspective
(percent)
Tax reime  Mexico  (1991)  United States (1990)  Canada (1990)
Corporate  incme tax rate:  ganeralt  35 + 3.9 a 38.9  34 + 6 - 40  28  + 15  43
Withholding tax rates
Interest  35  30  28
Dividends  0-40  30  25
Technology  transfer fees  21  30  25
Royalties  40  30  25
Indexation of deductions  Full  No  No
Loss carry forward  5  15  7
Loss carry backward  0  3  3
Ninim/alternative  21 assets tax  201  on taxable income  0.175X  on capital  in excess
Ninima  tax  inclusive of tax  of $10 miLlion creditale
preferences  against 31 surtax an
corporate  profits
Capital gainr taxation
Coverage  Ful  Full  TFlo-thirds
Indexation  Full  No  so
Rate  35  34  28
Dividenda  dedactian  No  Yee  Yes
Full expensirof  inestment  llo  no  no
Investment  tax credits  Regional  mid  prority  Energy  investment,  ReSianl m1 RIO
sectors  rehabilitation  of
real estate,  targeted
Job  credit
gI  In Mexico  the profit-sharing  rate and, in  the United States ard Can'da,  the average  provincial or state tax rates are added  to the basic federat rate.
Source: Uilrte  (19868),  Price Waterhouse (1968,  1989),  Nancor  Herios  (1989). Intermtional  Bureau  of  Fiscal Docunntation (1988), and  Si-Din  (1989).- 36  -
Table  A3
Mexico:  Ffscal  Incentives  1980-1988
1980  a 100
Mttflions  of  Pesos)
Impited  GOP  Ffcat  Incentaces  I/
Year  Deflator  (current  prices)  (1980  constant  pricos)
1980  100.0  22,046  22,046
1981  126.0  38,006  30,163
1982  202.8  53,753  26,505
1983  386.1  34,952  9,053
198X  614.4  37,192  6,053
1985  963.1  48,900  5,077
1986  1,679.5  109,152  6,499
198I  4,082.2  202,324  4,957
1988  3  6,192.7  96.257  1,554
I/  Includes CEPROFIS,  Agreement  of  Annual  Validity,  and  Incentives  for  Export  promotion.
Source:  Instituto  Nacional  de  Estadistica,  GeogrefIa  e  Informatica.  - Secretaria  de  Programecion  y  Presupuesto  - Dire Genrsl  de  Potitice  do  Ingresos.  S.H.C.P.- 37  -
TABLE  A4
REVENUE  FOREGONE  DUE TO GRANTING  OF FISCAL  INCENTIVES
BY TYPE OF FISCAL  INCENTE  MEASURE
INSTRUMENT  1983  9  1984  1985  1986  X  1987  %  1988  %
CEPROFiS  17,021  48.2  24,749  55.9  26,173  42.2  80,559  55.7  159,151  54.5  82,230  42.8
Agreements  of Annual
Valdihy  2,298  6.5  5,273  11.9  7,687  12.4  25,926  18.6  43,687  15.0  13,969  7.3
Border  Annas  and  Duty
Free Zones  4,780  13.5  6,030  13.6  17,187  27.7  25,143  18.0  75,687  26.0  50=22  26.1
CEDIS  2,614  7.4  5,615  12.4  4,329  7.0  4,227  3.0  7,395  2.5  35,450  18.5
Other  8,584  24.3  2,575  5.8  6,699  10.8  3,7841  2.7  6,03(9  2.0  10,74  5.3
TotaL  35.297  100.0  44.242  100.0  62.075  0Q  1  100  2  100.0  192.128  100.0
Soure:  Sec_ari  de Hacenda y Credito  Pubhco
16  Incldes 2,227 mllion pesos of import  tax runs  to exporters  (Drawbacks).
ai  Icbldes 5,689  nilion pesos of import  tax returns  to exportns (Dawbacks).
21/ *nua-Junmof  1988.
4/  nclbdes  10,257  milion pesos  of impoct  tax rdtuns to exportes (Drawbacks).- 38  -
Table AS
Pormgone  Rvamuca  Due to Invstnmnt Tax Cedits (CEPROFIS)
By type of Instrur.nt
1986  - 1988
1986  %  1987  s  1988  %
A.  Investmeat  and Employment  44,618  55.8  99,397  62.8  14,391  17.5
of which:
(a)  Prioriy Indusies  3S,622  44.6  81.564  51.5  9,611  11.7
Most Favored  na  - na  - - -
Ot0  ma  - ma  - -
(b) Small Indudsie  1,S20  1.9  4,348  2.8  1,870  2.3
Mioroindustry  1S7  0.2  440  0.3  168  0.2
(o) National Machinery  and
equipment  6,71S  8.4  12,246  7.7  2,665  3.2
(d)  Employment  Gneration  604  0.7  799  0.5  77  0.1
B.  Mining and Metalury  8,353  10.5  22,999  14.5  4,340  S.3
C.  Basi  Produsb (Milk)  3,133  3.9  6,440  4.1  9,938  '  12.1
D.  Indusrial Developmen  94  0.1  1,510  1.0  80  0.1
E.  Technology  Developmet  368  0.5  258  0.1  -
P.  Environment  na  *a  - -
0.  Mechant Fleet  17,437  21.8  13,547  8.6  1,492  1.8
H.  Other  5,917  7.4  14,163  8.9  51,989  63.2
TOTAL  79,920  100.0  158,284  100.0  82,230  100.0
Souce: Seretsia  de Hacienda  y Credito PublicI |  i[III  i  a  I.  i.
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Table A7
Meico:  Foregone  Revenues  by Investment  Tax Credis (CEPROFIS)  by Manufactuing  Ioduaty
1979  - 1988
(m million  pes)
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Food, Dlinks and
tobacco  1  402  583  1,597  1,124  1,448  1,337  2,673  6,830  3,043
Textles  5  218  445  700  366  450  285  1,156  4,280  765
Wood  and Wood  Products  1  64  203  262  105  99  234  321  565  736
FPaerandPperpowrodcs  - 123  215  S60  345  547  809  1,598  3,439  7,151
Cbmicalb and Patrokum
deivadves  S  165  1,521  2,35S  1,235  1,768  2,27  3,627  11,025  4,669
Prod. non-meualis  minam  6  1,804  2,666  2,169  1,250  1,557  3,449  5,895  11,254  1,182
Basic metas  1  308  3,556  3,203  4,103  8,0SS  9,298  24,441  47,572  785
Metalc  products,  mahuinery
and equiwma  4  278  1,198  2,565  2,269  4,286  3,759  7,933  11,793  1,587
Oher indudris  - 6  14  33  48  56  44  58  200  426
TOTAL  23  3,368  10,401  13,454  10,845  18,266  21,485  47,702  96,958  20,344
Soue.:  Dirceion Geoual de PNMica  de  ngrvso.  S.H.C.P.
may 16, 1989- 41  -
TABLE AS
REVENUE  FOREGONE  DUE TO GRANTING  OF FISCAL  INCENTIVES
TO BORDER  AREAS  AND DUTY  FREE ZOMES
1983-1986
(in Millon Pesos)
INSTRUMENT  1983  %  1984  %  1985  %  1986  5  1987  %  1988  %
Tax exanption for the
importation  of basic
and semi-basic
productsl  4,337  90.7  5,582  92.5  L5,986  93.1  23,829  96.5  72,289  99.8  50,2222  99.9 Commerial Centers  131  2.7  167  2.8  267  1.6  - - 161  0.2  58  0.1 Industial Promotion  169  3.3  285  4.7  925  5.4  872  3.5  -
Other  153  3.2  - - - - - - -
TOTAL:  4.780  100.0  6.034  100.0  17.178  100.0  24.701  100.0  72.450  100.0  150.280  100.0
Source: Secrtaa  de Hacienda  y Cedito Publioo
1/  The main goods  mcluded  are chicken,  cheese, butter, used fires and furnitr,  lard, domestic  appliances,  canned  fuit  and vegeables, ato  parts, flour products, and clothing.
LI January-June  of 1988.- 42  -
TABLE  A9
FISCAL  REVENUE  LOSS  DUE TO AGREE?ENlS OF ANNUAL  VALIDIfY 1983 - 1988
By Type  of I  _nunew
(n  Milion Pcs)
INSTRUMENT 
1983  %  1984 
1985 
1  1986  5  1987 
1988
Produlion of Cas  and Couoncnts of whichl 




N A-  N.A.  369  7.0  0  0.0  - - -
b)F  imallporu 
NA.  NA.  0  0.0  0  0.0  - - - - - -
c) Fin  Assembly 
N.A.  NA.  941  17.8  1,420  18.5  - - - - - -
}mpou  of Pfr;y  Matma, Pm,  and  nufated
goods 
839  36.5  1,781  33.8  4,146  53.9  13,604  62.8  37,027  92.9  924  12.0
OtM 2
1,413  61.5  2,182  41.4  2,121  27.6  8,048  37.2  2,846  7.1  6,804  68.0
a) BoIled So$ Drins 
- - - - - - 8,000  37.0  2,739  6.8  6,804  88.0
b) Power for Expoation 
- - - - - - 48  0.2  107  0.3  - -
Total 
22  100,0 
100.0  2,§  100.0  2162  100.0  39873  100.0  7,  100.0
Soumes: Socretaia de HacEin  y Credio Pubico
11 Not Effcve  in 1986. Vi  Mainy agreements  to produc botkd  sot  dris  and to produce Bowen for exporin.- 43  -
TABLE  AIO
REVENUE  FOREGONE  DUE TO THE GRANTING  OF FISCAL  INCENTIVES
TO SUPPORT  THE EXPORT  SECTOR
1983-1988
by Type  of  lnsnrumt
(m Mion  PEbsos)
INSTRUMENT  1983  %  1984  X  1985  %  1986  X  1987  %  1988  %
CEDIS  of which  2,614  100.0  5,615  100.0  5,451  89.0  4,227  65.5  7,395  56.5  35,450  77.6
1. Mandfactring  1,090  41.7  449  8.0  943  15.4  - - - - - - 2. Trding  compa  1,323  50.6  4,888  87.1  3,386  55.3  3,154  48.9  158  1.2  - - 3. ToChnolOgy  and
Servicoea  201  7.7  278  4.9  1,122  183  1,073  16.6  7,237  55.3  35,450  77.6
Impoit Tax Return to
Exptum  Dawbwacks)  0  0.0  0  0.0  671  11.0  2,227  34.5  5,689  43.5  10.257  22.4
TOTAL  2.614  0  S.15  61&22  100.0  6.454  100.0  13.084  100.0  45.707  100.0
Soon= Scetar  de Hacienda  y Cramo Public.
N, Mainly  consuction  _atais  nd sv.- 44  -
TABLE  All 
DISTRIBUTION  OF THE FISCAL  INCENTIVES  BY ECONOMIC  ZONE
(Milion current Pesos)
ECONOMIC  ZONE  1986  %  1987  %  1988  %
Priority Areas:  37.987  48.5  93.664  63.6  1.12  74.4
IA:  20,850  26.6  75,594  51.3  9,191  60.0
IB:  10,115  12.9  10,622  7.2
I:  7,022  9.0  7,448  5.1  2,211  14.4
Controlled  Areas  26.590  33.9  27.083  18.4  919  6.0
MA:  20,352  26.0  15,826  10.8  750  4.9
BIB:  6,238  7.9  11,257  7.6  169  1.1
Pet  of the country  13.818  17J6  26.490  18.0  2.993  19.6
Total:  78.395  100.0  147.237  100.0  15314  00.0
Sourc:  S.H.C.P.
/  lhncudes  Pririty Aures  IA and IB.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS906  Bulgaria's  Evolving  Legal  Framework Cheryl  W.  Gray  May 1992  CECSE
for Private  Sector  Development  Peter lanachkov  37188
WPS907  Institutional  Reform  in Emerging  Robert  Pardy  May 1992  Z. Seguis
Securities  Markets  37664
WPS908  Tax Incentives,  Market  Power,  and  Dagmar  Rajagopal  May  1992  C. Jones
Corporate  Investment:  A Rational  Anwar  Shah  37669
Expectations  Model  Applied  to Pakistani
and Turkish Industries
WPS909  Parallel  Markets,  the Foreign  Janine  Aron  May  1992  V. Barthelmes
Exchange  Auction,  and Exchange  Ibrahim  A. Elbadawi  39175
Rate  Unification  in Zambia
WPS910  Policy  Issues  in Financial  Regulation  Dimitri  Vittas  May 1992  W. Pitayatonakarn
37666
WPS911  Does  Exchange  Rate Volatility  Hinder Ying  Qian  May 1992  D. Gustafson
Export  Growth?  Additional  Evidence  Panos  Varangis  33714
WPS912  Understanding  the Investment  Cycle  Andr6s  Solimano  May 1992  E. Khine
in Adjustment  Programs:  Evidence  from  39361
Reforming  Economies
WPS913  The  Women's  Development  Program  Maitreyi  Das  May 1992  L. Bennett
in Rajasthan:  A Case  Study  in Grcup  82772
Formation  for Women's  Development
WPS914  Health  Personnel  Development  in  J. Patrick  Vaughan  May 1992  0. Nadora
Sub-Saharan  Africa  31091
WPS915  Trade  Policy  and Exchange  Rate  W. Max  Corden  May 1992  CECTP
Issues  in the Former  Soviet  Union  37947
WPS916  Measuring  the Risk  of Default  in Six  Marc  Chesney  June 1992  S. King-Watson
Highly  Indebted  Countries  Jacques Morisset  31047
WPS917  Creditor  Country  Regulations  and  Asli Demirguc-Kunt  June 1992  K. Waelti
Commercial  Bank  Lending  to Developing  37664
Countries
WPS918  Tax Evasion  and  Tax  Reform  in a  Jaime  de Melo  June 1992  D. Ballantyne
Low-lncome  Economy:  General  David  Roland-Holst  37947
Equilibrium  Estimates  for  Mona  Haddad
Madagascar
WPS919  Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal  Deficits,  Roberto  de Rezende  June 1992  L. Ly
Nominal  and Real:  Measurement  Rocha  37352
and Policy Issues  Fernando  SaldanhaPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS920  Economic  Incentives  and Point  Raymond  J. Kopp  June 1992  C. Jones
Source  Emissions:  Choice  of  37754
Modeling  Platform
WPS921  Road Infrastructure  and Economic  Cesar  Queiroz  June 1992  M. Laygo
Development:  Some Diagnostic  Surhid  Gautam  31261
Indicators
WPS922  Central  America  at a Crossroads  Sylvia  Saborio  June 41992  M. Colinet
Constantine  Michalopoulos  37044
WPS923  Listening  to Firms:  How  to Use  Firm-  Andrew  H. W.  Stone  June 1992  P. Infante
Level Surveys  to Assess  Constraints  37642
on Private  Sector Development
WPS924  How  Reduced  Demand  for Children  Rafael  Rofman  June 1992  0. Nadora
and Access  to Family  Planning  31091
Accelerated  the Fertility  Decline  in
Colombia
WPS925  A General-Equilibrium-Based  Social  Ngee-Choon  Chia  June 1992  A. Cox
Policy  Model  for Cote  d'lvoire  Sadek  Wahba  34778
John  Whalley
WPS926  Options  for Reshaping  the Railway  Neil  E.  Moyer  June 1992  B. Gregory
Louis  S. Thompson  33744
WPS927  General  Equilibrium  Effects  of  Andrew  Feltenstein  June 1991  C. Jones
Investment  Incentives  in Mexico  AnwarShah  37699